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SUMMARY 
Clusters, an important tool for providing matching answers to chal-
lenges from transnational companies, are regional concentrations of 
firms, research and education institutions, regional development bodies 
and other participants sharing some joint technological platform and 
aiming to increase their joint competitive strength through collaboration 
at various levels of activity. Transnationals may become involved in 
clusters in various countries, e.g. through affiliates in host economies. 
One form of cluster may be collaboration of transnationals and their 
partners and suppliers. The paper analyses the main attributes of clus-
ters and the rationale behind them, before considering the inclination 
of transnationals to develop supplier networks. It goes on to describe 
the activities and levels of cooperation among transnationals—chiefly 
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)—and local suppliers. Based 
on analysis of supplier network patterns, the paper compares this co-
operation content with typical activities in successful clusters. It mainly 
deals with Hungarian experiences, though most may also be relevant 
to other transition economies. The main finding is that transnational 
companies’ primary interest lies elsewhere, not in cluster development, 
but that in the presence of strong local initiative and professional clus-
ter management they may gain interest in cluster activity of certain 
types. 
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1) CLUSTER CONCEPT AND     
DEFINITIONS* 
Spatial concentration and specialization of 
economic activities has been recognized and 
analysed for over a century. Alfred Mar-
shall (1890) studied determinants of indus-
trial agglomerations and found three deci-
sive factors: access to a developed labour 
market and deep supplier background, 
and the possibility of rapid knowledge and 
information transfer among firms. More 
recent publications make similar points 
(Krugman 1995, Venables 2001).  
The main rationale behind spatial con-
centration is to achieve agglomeration 
economies. A distinction has been made 
between different types of agglomeration 
economies (i.e. various kinds of rationale 
behind the agglomeration process). One 
type relates to general economies of re-
gional and urban concentration that apply 
to all firms and industries in a single loca-
tion (urbanization economies), representing 
the external economies enjoyed by firms 
through from the large scale of operations 
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izes findings of the joint Japanese–Hungarian pro-
gramme “Multinationals and Local Resources” of 
the Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi 
University, and the HAS institutes of Sociology 
and for World Economics. Funding came from a 
research grant-in-aid of the Ministry of Education 
and Sciences, Japan (No. 19402023), the Nomura 
Foundation for Academic Promotion, the Tokyo 
Maritime Kagami Memorial Foundation and IBM 
Hungary. 
of the whole agglomeration. These forces 
lead to the emergence of industrial-core 
and metropolitan regions. A second type 
consists of the more specific economies for 
firms engaged in similar or linked activities 
that lead to the emergence of industrial 
districts (localization economies). Such dis-
tricts provide a base for flexible produc-
tion systems that can serve volatile markets. 
In both cases, the agglomeration economies 
are rooted in functioning processes where 
linkages among firms, institutions and in-
frastructure in a given location give rise to 
economies of scale and scope, e.g., the de-
velopment of general labour markets and 
pools of specialized skills, dense interactions 
between local suppliers and customers, and 
shared infrastructure and other localized 
externalities. Agglomeration economies arise 
when such links lower costs and increase 
returns for firms taking part in the local 
exchange. Presence in agglomerations im-
proves performance by reducing the costs 
of transactions for both tangibles and in-
tangibles. 
The emergence of the cluster concept is 
bound to seminal work by Michael Porter 
(1990, 1998 and 2003), whose “diamond 
model” posits four sets of related forces to 
explain industrial dynamics and competi-
tiveness, associated with factor input condi-
tions, sophisticated local demand conditions, 
related and supported industries, and firm 
structure, strategy and rivalry. A core no-
tion around his model stresses how a col-
laborative, mutually supportive group of 
actors may enhance regional competitive-
ness in global markets and thereby gener-
ate growth and other benefits. There has 
also been exploration and emphasis on the 
significance of face-to-face contacts and 
personal demonstration, exchange of ex-
perience, and the role of geographical 
proximity to knowledge transfers and inno-
vation.  
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Another line of related economic 
thought elaborated on knowledge creation 
and innovation as a social process engag-
ing individuals that exchange tacit and 
explicit knowledge. The importance of 
social networks in the functioning of 
clusters was stressed by Pouder and St. 
John (1996) and Saxenian (1994). Trust-
based relationships and social capital may 
be important for enabling horizontal co-
operation between individuals within and 
across firms and institutions. Here clus-
ters are not just fixed flows of goods 
and services or production inputs, but 
dynamic arrangements based on knowl-
edge generation and innovation in a 
broad sense. Innovation, knowledge gen-
eration and transfer become primary ex-
planatory factors of dynamic clusters as 
new agglomeration types.  
Clusters may bring new types of benefit 
to participants, as compared with agglom-
erations. These originate in joint activity 
and cooperation. Agglomeration-related 
economies of scale and scope may also be 
enjoyed by cluster members, but they are 
completed by synergies of cooperation. So 
clusters are made up not only of physical 
flows of inputs and outputs, but by inten-
sive exchange of business information, 
know-how, and technological expertise, in 
traded and non-traded forms. 
Clusters are defined in many different 
ways by authors (e.g. EC 2003; ICEG 
2006; Clement and Welbich-Macek 2007; 
Europe Cluster Observatory, 2007) wishing 
to concretize interpretations of Porter’s 
very loose original definition as “geo-
graphic concentrations of interconnected 
companies, specialized suppliers and ser-
vice providers, firms in related industries, 
and associated institutions (for example 
universities, standards agencies, and trade 
associations) in particular fields that com-
pete but also co-operate” (Porter 1998, p. 
199). 
Four features are seen as crucial: geo-
graphic concentration, specialization, alli-
ance among heterogeneous market agents 
and institutions, and the co-presence of 
competition and cooperation among them. 
All these four elements are indeed crucial, 
as they express the complex links of clus-
ters with Porter’s overall concept of com-
petitiveness. Adding new characteristics to 
the definition usually limits the scope of 
clusters to one or another potential area. 
This new emphasis usually reflects actual 
policy goals that institutions or govern-
ments wish to support with clusters. One 
current emphasis in EU policy is innova-
tion; support for innovative clusters ap-
pears in the 2007–14 budget. Clusters are 
usually innovative in a broad sense and 
innovations the main outputs of the syner-
gies of cluster cooperation. But there is a 
risk of government misinterpreting the in-
novative cluster phenomenon and confining 
clustering to branches regarded as innova-
tive (hi-tech). Another risk is that overem-
phasis on innovation in cluster activities 
may mean less heed to crucial basic co-
operation functions that are likewise vital 
to a solid base of innovative cooperation. 
So narrowing the original cluster concept 
may effectively block important cluster 
functions. 
2) CLUSTERS AND THEIR SPECIFIC 
FEATURES  
This section points to some main elements 
of clusters commonly cited in theoretical 
and empirical literature. The features 
need not be present in all clusters, nor 
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should they be insisted upon in policy-
making. They illustrate the most common 
features of modern co-locations of firms 
called clusters and determine the tasks 
and activity of cluster organizations. 
2.1. Spatial concentration 
Spatial concentration has always been 
central to the concept. Though some have 
tried to disprove or query the importance 
of physical agglomeration, there are 
many aspects that remain central to the 
cluster concept. Venables (2001) proved 
that “death of distance”— extensive use 
of modern IT and other technological ad-
vances—does not necessarily weaken ag-
glomeration effects. Some effects weaken, 
others strengthen. So the structure of the 
balance of centrifugal and centripetal 
forces has probably changed, as have the 
structure and functions of agglomera-
tions, but agglomerations and clusters 
remain strong features of regional devel-
opment. 
The facts underpinning the importance 
of geographical concentration described in 
the previous section have remained 
largely unchanged since the seminal 
works of Marshal (1890), but their 
weights have altered. Economies of scale 
and scope from sharing infrastructure 
and information, and from the proximity 
of suppliers, factor markets and customer 
demand, continue to reduce the transac-
tion costs of arms-length business. So 
firms may feel that their membership of 
a set of inter-related actors, which can in 
a given region enhance efficiency, sup-
ports their productivity growth and en-
hances their innovativeness, notably 
through better access to knowledge, ideas 
and skills. One of this set of potential 
advantages that demands special attention 
is access to specialized factor markets. 
This allows companies to concentrate on 
their core competencies and outsource 
auxiliary activities to specialized suppliers. 
Increased flexibility is achieved through 
cooperative production networks, in most 
cases based on a dense population of 
firms with related activities. Networks op-
erating within clusters may enhance co-
operation in areas as diverse as training, 
finance, technological development, prod-
uct design, marketing, exports or distri-
bution.  
2.2. Specialization 
Clusters are usually viewed as organiza-
tions or networks of participating actors 
linked via a kind of core activity, which 
provides clear emphasis on the same 
markets and processes. Traditional clus-
ters showed strong sectoral specialization 
patterns. But various studies have found 
that many clusters have limited transac-
tions among firms within the cluster, e.g. 
in the form of buyer-supplier contacts. 
Attention has gradually shifted to the sig-
nificance of knowledge spillovers and to 
dynamic clusters. While Porter was 
mainly concerned with the existence and 
reproduction of clusters of technologically 
related firms, latest attempts are targeted 
at analysing the learning abilities and 
creativity of spatial agglomerations. In-
stead of specialization and spatial cluster-
ing of related industries, emphasis is 
placed on the presence of a regional 
spectrum of skills and competencies, 
where interaction among different actors 
leads to new, often unexpected ideas. The 
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concept of dynamic clusters elaborated 
and introduced by Sölvell et al. (2003) is 
very much in line with current develop-
ments in the production factors engaging 
technology and skills intensively, with the 
increasing knowledge content of traded 
goods, and with services becoming more 
pervasive. 
Specialization in dynamic clusters is 
not primarily expressed in co-location of 
business entities in a given sector or 
dense business contacts. Nor is specializa-
tion viewed necessarily as limited to a 
given product or industry category. A 
dynamic cluster may go beyond relations 
within a specific sector and its value-
chain. Clustering across traditional sec-
toral boundaries can be an important 
source of innovation and competitiveness. 
However, effective clustering still calls for 
a strong element of complementary spe-
cialization between actors, a common de-
nominator. Actors focusing on core busi-
ness can couple up to these useful com-
mon-denominator linkages, as important 
synergies in a learning process that en-
gages various organizations. Examples of 
such inter-sectoral specialization areas are 
telematics, biotechnology and many other 
areas utilizing an interdisciplinary ap-
proach in their innovation process. The 
emphasis in dynamic clusters is on the 
role of knowledge generation, innovation 
and information exchange, in contrast 
with traditional clusters, which makes this 
one of their most important functions. 
Information sharing and innovation also 
occur in traditional clusters, but their 
prime function is to enhance regular 
trading contacts and production via vari-
ous economies of scale and scope. 
2.3. Cluster actors 
Plurality is essential to clusters, which 
must consist of various kinds of actors, 
not just firms, if they are to be success-
ful. Without such plurality, an agglom-
eration is no more than an enlarged en-
terprise—a network of companies in 
which one has the prime role, where 
smaller firms may just serve as subcon-
tractors or clients. This distinction is not 
trivial. There is strong motivation to re-
duce transaction costs and friction be-
tween firms by concentrating activities in 
single firms and a strongly dependent 
supplier network. But today’s costs of 
administration, management and control, 
risk management, and search for sources 
of flexibility favour a stronger focus on 
the core business of a single organization 
and the formation of continuous relations 
and learning processes between separate 
entities. Recent cluster mappings (e.g. 
Commission 2003) report that most clus-
ters comprise a fairly large number of 
small and medium-sized firms (SMEs). 
Clusters may also involve intensive links 
and alliances with institutions like univer-
sities, research institutes, public authori-
ties, consumer organizations, think tanks, 
etc. Sölvell et al. (2003) argue that four 
main categories of actors are vital and 
normally present in clusters: companies, 
governments, the research community, 
and financial institutions. Of importance 
for cluster initiatives are also the institu-
tions for collaboration, defined as formal 
or informal actors to promote interest in 
the cluster initiative among the actors. 
Their role may vary widely. They may 
promote cluster initiatives (top-down de-
velopment of cluster cooperation) or per-
form a series of cluster actions. 
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2.4. Competition and cooperation 
in clusters 
Connections between cluster actors display 
simultaneous competition and cooperation. 
Even in clusters, competition remains an 
important element of the market, deliver-
ing major incentives to improve corporate 
performance by reducing prices, increas-
ing quality and reliability, searching for 
new products and markets, and boosting 
innovation. Clusters are not about reduc-
ing the importance or extent of competi-
tion. Nor should they serve as elite clubs 
seeking privileges for their members, but 
remain open to new entrants. Open entry 
can also give new impetus, providing a 
source of new technologies and knowl-
edge for incumbents as well.  
At the same time, actors in a cluster 
may cooperate round a core activity us-
ing their competencies to complement 
each other. Firms operating in tandem 
may be able to attract fresh resources 
and services not available to isolated 
firms. By pooling resources and risks and 
developing complementary functions, firms 
achieve economies of scale and scope. 
Central to the quality of cluster informa-
tion exchange and knowledge flows are 
trust and recognition. Here trust is about 
sharing a vision and belief in mutually 
fruitful relations. Building trust means 
people enabling others to believe in their 
mutual long-term benefit. This may be 
demanding on first contact, especially as 
new actors enter new markets.  
While proximity matters for informal 
knowledge flows, global linkages are 
equally essential. Transnationals are pri-
mary sources of skill and knowledge 
transfer and have been decisive to the 
development of many local clusters. Many 
clusters have lively contacts with actors 
outside the region. This is reinforced by 
globalization and post-Ford disintegration 
of production systems. The internal 
knowledge-pool of firms is complemented 
by a knowledge base distributed through 
their whole value chains, where much 
knowledge enters the cluster in the form 
of new machinery, intermediate inputs, or 
ordering specifications. There may be an 
extensive interface between cluster firms 
and their outside environment.  
2.5. Critical mass 
Inner dynamics can be achieved only if 
numerous actors participate in the clus-
ter, providing the critical mass needed to 
obtain various economies of scale and 
scope. These require multiple interactions, 
along with a variety of possible combina-
tions, a sufficient pool for choice, and a 
process of learning by doing. The pres-
ence of critical mass may also give sup-
port to industrial restructuring in a clus-
ter, by fostering linkages and complemen-
tarities between flexible SMEs and larger 
corporations. Critical mass may serve as 
a partial buffer against exogenous shocks 
and pressures, including loss of impor-
tant, even key member companies. Lack 
of it can leave a region or cluster vul-
nerable to the loss of specific resources 
and skills essential to cluster development. 
Path dependence too means economic de-
velopment is likely to be focused on 
places possessed of a critical accumula-
tion of assets and skills. Nonetheless, it is 
not possible to say what constitutes a 
sufficient level of mass, or even exactly 
how it should be measured.  
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2.6. The life cycle of a cluster 
A further important element of clusters is 
mode of organization: how the actors are 
linked. Cluster organization usually un-
dergoes changes between periods in the 
cluster life cycle. Clusters are not tempo-
rary solutions to acute problems. They 
have a sense of direction and inner sta-
bility over time, but their structure is not 
rigid or static, and experience shows they 
have development stages. These may not 
be identical, any more than the pace of 
development need be similar. But there is 
an inherent logic in the way clusters de-
velop, so that some characteristic patterns 
can be discerned.  
The first or pre-cluster stage entails 
simple co-location of various market ac-
tors with potential for institutionalized 
cooperation activities. The second, emerg-
ing stage is where several actors in an 
agglomeration start to cooperate round a 
core activity and realize joint opportuni-
ties through their linkages. The third 
stage of cluster development is to attract 
new entrants through positive experiences 
of collaboration. Recruits may be engaged 
in the same or related core activities and 
be present in the geographical vicinity of 
the developing cluster. Organization of 
cluster activity may be the initial activity 
of formal or informal institutions for col-
laboration. The outside face of the cluster 
becomes established in the form of a la-
bel, website, etc. A mature cluster is one 
that has reached the critical mass for 
long-term stable existence and developed 
external relations with other clusters, ac-
tivities and regions. There is an internal 
dynamic of new-firm creation through 
start-ups, joint ventures and spin-offs. In 
the final stage a mature cluster trans-
forms into new cluster organizations. In 
time, the core competencies of firms and 
clusters change in response to changes in 
markets, technologies and processes. A 
cluster must innovate and respond to 
survive, stay sustainable and avoid stag-
nation. This can mean changing into one 
or more new clusters focused round new 
core activities (SRI International 2001). 
2.7. Cluster activities 
Clusters may vary in many ways. They 
may evolve in organic bottom-up ways or 
be initiated by development institutions. 
Their sectoral focus may range from ag-
riculture and manufacturing to high 
value-added services. They may be sup-
ported by an institution for cooperation 
or serve as a branch of a regional de-
velopment agency. These differences influ-
ence the organizational structure, main 
aims and strategic goals of a cluster, 
and the activities performed. Still, there 
are four main areas and types of activi-
ties generally pursued by clusters: social 
capital development, development of stra-
tegic linkages, creation of vision and 
strategy, and specific actions. 
Social capital is one of the main 
framework conditions of functioning clus-
ters. The first step is to prepare the 
ground for the cluster initiative. The 
communication process is launched by 
establishing among key actors an aware-
ness of the potential mutual benefits of 
clustering. Open communication and 
transparency between key actors is cru-
cial to building the necessary trust. Clus-
ter initiatives may need to nurture trust 
by broadening the scope of information-
sharing and establishing of advanced 
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knowledge networks. This typically suc-
ceeds in successful clusters in broadening 
the number of committed actors and 
keeping the cluster open and outward-
oriented. This way the contribution of the 
group far exceeds that of individual 
firms. Furthermore, the cluster may 
achieve critical mass by incorporating 
new entrants. Difficulties in launching the 
cluster initiative may be substantial, as 
the risks and costs firms have to expect 
when participating may often be per-
ceived as insurmountable. This may make 
SMEs particularly hesitate to spend time 
and effort on a network with vaguely 
defined objectives. They may also fear 
losing strategic assets and other informa-
tion to other cluster members, especially 
large firms. So they may wish to start 
with less strategic alliances before enter-
ing into more complex cooperation tasks.  
The initial step at this stage is to for-
malize existing linkages. This is the point 
at which most cluster initiatives are 
launched; they belong to the network of 
formalized linkages through establishment 
of an institution of cooperation. Struc-
tured routines for interactions are formu-
lated and cluster vision and strategy de-
veloped. This is often supported by com-
petence auditing, a kind of mapping of 
the competitive advantages of the region 
and the competencies of the participating 
actors, and determining what gaps re-
main. A visualized form of the audit re-
sults is a competence matrix that ex-
presses core competencies and stimulates 
the creation of local linkages among 
firms, universities, research institutions 
and related industries, with the aim of 
spurring local economic growth. It serves 
as a guide for potential partners in iden-
tifying cooperation possibilities for various 
corporate functions. The matrix can be 
also used by firms as a reference and 
sales argument to illustrate their extended 
cooperation network. Preparation of the 
competence system matrix is especially 
useful for newly funded clusters, where 
there is insufficient information on indi-
vidual actors. 
Cluster initiatives may wish to develop 
a shared vision, common goals and strat-
egy for achievement. A detailed regional 
analysis can help to structure the starting 
point of collaboration. Usually, goals of 
cluster development and the baseline for 
possible future evaluation are put in 
place at this stage as well. Institutions for 
cooperation will gain more sense of di-
rection if the appropriate coverage and 
scope for the evaluation process is de-
fined. A main goal of a cluster initiative 
seeking to remain viable in the long run 
is to become self-sustainable at some 
stage of development. When the key 
competencies are clear, a strategic analy-
sis is prepared to assess the current 
situation and project possible future de-
velopments. The most popular of the 
many proven heuristic and statistical 
methods for use in this work have been 
foresight exercises, which usually involves 
knowledgeable agents and key stake-
holders. This method is valuable for gath-
ering important knowledge and reflects 
on the insights and special interests of 
the cluster participants who will be criti-
cally engaged in its interactions. 
Bringing together decision-makers at 
the outset of cluster development may 
also be beneficial by facilitating commit-
ment and engagement. Goals and action 
plans will also require adjustments, as 
clusters need continuously to redefine 
their visions and strategies if they are to 
stay innovative. So strategic planning and 
implementation is an iterative, inter-
related process.  
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Once vision and strategy have been 
defined, the implementation of tasks can 
begin. This requires a set of cluster ac-
tions that follow a defined plan of action 
and are applied as a way of strengthen-
ing the cluster initiative and improving 
the surrounding competitive environment. 
Table 1 lists a few of the cluster actions 
commonly undertaken. 
Cluster actors’ objectives when joining 
the initiative may be different or even 
contradictory. Objectives of the major 
types of actors will be diverse by defini-
tion. Firms may be motivated by possible 
access to complementary skills of other 
firms, regional policy makers and institu-
tions are interested in local growth and 
prosperity, while politicians may be look-
ing for kudos and extra votes. Some of 
the objectives are directly related to eco-
nomic return, but social esteem and per-
sonal rewards also matter. It is not easy 
to find a sufficiently concrete common 
denominator of the various ambitions. It 
is not sufficient to share such common 
goals and objectives as improving the 
foundations for economic activity (cluster 
environment) or improving conditions of 
Table 1 
Typical cluster actions 
 
Improve cluster dynamics Improve cluster environment 
New technology and 
firm growth 
Inter-actor network 
creation Cluster formation Factor markets Cluster basis 
New technology: 
• Seminars, meet-
ings, workshops to 
ease technology 
diffusion in clus-
ter. 
• Establish centres to 
develop new pro-
duction technolo-
gies. 
• Create observatory 
of technical 
trends. 
Firm growth: 
• Support cluster-
based incubators. 
• Encourage entre-
preneur networks. 
• Provide business 
assistance. 
• Launch marketing 
and image cam-
paigns to attract 
new firms. 
• Improve FDI in-
centives. 
• Improve financing 
conditions for 
spin-offs by regu-
latory changes or 
special mechanisms 
or investment 
funds. 
Networking: 
• Form cross-agency 
cluster teams. 
• Foster firm net-
works. 
• Foster sharing of 
personal networks. 
• Facilitate external 
connections. 
Commercial coop-
eration: 
• Form export net-
works. 
• Compile market 
intelligence. 
• Coordinate pur-
chasing. 
• Establish technical 
standards. 
Joint R & D pro-
jects 
Cluster analysis:
• Conduct a compe-
tence audit. 
• Undertake a stra-
tegic study and 
analysis. 
• Model and am-
plify systemic rela-
tionships. 
• Conduct bench-
marking analysis. 
• Organize and 
disseminate infor-
mation in the 
cluster. 
Engagement and 
service delivery: 
• Create or formal-
ize institution for 
cooperation and 
communication 
channels. 
• Improve cluster 
awareness. 
• Ease interaction 
between various 
government areas 
and cluster actors.
Cluster marketing: 
• Create brand for 
region. 
• Actively promote 
cluster. 
• Target inward 
investment. 
Specialized labour 
supply: 
• Provide manage-
ment and technical 
training. 
• Use clusters as 
context for learn-
ing. 
• Establish cluster 
skill centres. 
• Attract talent to 
region. 
Specialized capital 
markets: 
• Prioritize invest-
ments in cluster 
projects. 
• Give incentives or 
set aside funds 
for multi-firm 
projects. 
• Promote joint fi-
nancing, creation 
of special invest-
ment funds, or 
provision of credit 
guarantees. 
• Encourage sharing 
of risk across 
cluster actors. 
• Improve access to 
and usage of 
natural resources. 
Legal framework:
• Improve frame-
work conditions. 
• Evaluate competi-
tion policy. 
Infrastructure: 
• Develop new or 
improve existing 
infrastructure 
through joint ac-
tions and new fi-
nancing models. 
• Conduct private 
infrastructure pro-
jects. 
Social capital: 
• Foster expansion 
of personal net-
works. 
• Foster inter-firm 
communications 
and networks. 
S & T and R & D 
framework: 
• Support mutual 
realization or fi-
nancing of R & D 
projects. 
Source: Andersson et al. 2004. 
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the cluster (cluster dynamics). For the 
strength and dynamics of the cluster in 
the longer run, however, all participants 
need to experience an acceptable risk-
return ratio. This is particularly impor-
tant for innovative clusters, where risks 
of innovation and technological develop-
ment are immanently high and markets 
change quickly. 
3) FACTORS AFFECTING THE 
SHARE OF LOCAL SUPPLIES 
Linkages with affiliates of transnational 
corporations operating in Hungary can 
form a good basis for deeper relation-
ships between domestic firms and firms 
with foreign participation, including the 
formation of a cluster, as some cases in 
Hungary have shown. A supplier relation-
ship provides a potential basis for deeper 
cooperation, and according to some theo-
rists, it can in itself can be regarded as 
a low-level cluster (Bakács, Czakó and 
Sass 2006). All in all, the share of local 
suppliers in Hungary is lower than in 
more developed countries (e.g. the EU 15) 
and higher than in less developed ones. 
The level of local supplies remains lower 
than was expected at the time when the 
country opened up to FDI (Sass and 
Szanyi 2004). 
The share of local (backward) linkages 
of companies with foreign participation 
depends on several factors. This section 
concentrates on backward linkages and 
on manufacturing companies, listing the 
factors that influence the inclination of 
companies to foreign participation in their 
use of local suppliers (based on UNCTAD 
2001), complemented by other factors 
found relevant on the basis of literature 
or company case studies. Moreover, 
available empirical evidence shows how 
these factors affect the share of local 
suppliers in Hungary, which have re-
mained below the expectations so far. For 
this we first use the results of a ques-
tionnaire survey,1 and secondly draw evi-
dence from secondary sources (Hungarian 
literature on the topic and company case 
studies). Where information is available, 
we also present results from other com-
parable countries. 
3.1. The mode of FDI entry 
There are investment-type differences in 
local value added and use of local sup-
pliers. (See Blomström et al. 2000, Sass 
1997 for Hungarian companies based on 
the results of a questionnaire survey, or 
Szanyi 2001.) Understandably, some pri-
vatized companies retained their original 
domestic suppliers after restructuring, 
particularly if their main focus was on 
the domestic market. In the case of 
Tungsram in Hungary (a light-source 
manufacturer acquired by GE), the share 
of local suppliers is over 40 per cent, or 
in the case of Siemens (which acquired 
the Hungarian telephone company 
through privatization), the corresponding 
share is 35 per cent. For Electrolux 
                                                   
1 The questionnaire survey was carried out under 
the 5th framework programme research project 
SERD–2002–00111, 6th work package: Foreign 
and domestic firms as catalysts in changes in 
competitiveness in manufacturing. Four sectors 
(food, electronics, automotive and pharmaceutical) 
and companies employing more than 50 workers 
(in pharmaceuticals more than 20 workers) were 
analysed. There were responses from 161 compa-
nies giving mainly information on company net-
works and linkages, for 1998 and 2004. Selected 
findings of the questionnaire survey appear in 
Sass 2007. 
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(which bought the Lehel factory in the 
white goods sector), the share of local 
supplies for certain products reaches 80 
per cent. The targets of these privatiza-
tion transactions were relatively successful 
Hungarian companies, with a long history 
and tradition, and in Tungsram’s case a 
brand name and intense cooperation with 
foreign partners in production and trade 
before privatization. The activity specifics 
of these companies made it possible for 
other Hungarian companies to maintain 
supplier relationships or join in the sup-
plier network to them. The current 
names of other companies in the group 
are ZF Hungária Ltd, Knorr-Bremse Ltd, 
ABB Ltd and Rába (Table 2). 
With greenfield investment, though, it 
can take a long time to build up a local 
network of suppliers. Many greenfield 
investors use only a limited number of 
local suppliers, although in most cases 
there is an increase as the company set-
tles in (Table 3). Examples include Audi, 
Flextronics, LuK Savaria, Nokia, Samsung, 
Temic, and Visteon. The local share of 
supplies to Audi (automotive industry), 
for instance, rose from less than 1 per 
cent to 10 per cent (including the impact 
of establishing an R and D centre). With 
greenfield investments in the same sector 
as Tungsram (DL) by Philips, Nokia and 
Sony, each was using local sources for 
less than 10 per cent of supplies. The 
results of the questionnaire survey con-
firmed the existence of a link between 
mode of entry and share of local suppli-
ers. For privatized companies, it lay be-
tween 60 and 70 per cent of total inputs 
between 1998 and 2004, declining slightly 
over time. For greenfield investment it 
was 20–30 per cent, but growing slightly 
over time.  
With Hungary’s relatively long history 
of greenfield FDI, there is already evi-
dence in the economy of new networks 
being created by greenfield investors 
(Barta 2002; Szanyi 2002) There is also 
evidence of agglomeration effects and 
clusters being formed in Northern Trans-
danubia and the Budapest conurbation 
(Buzás 2000; Grosz 2000; Barta 2002) 
around companies with foreign participa-
tion, mainly greenfield investments. These 
form part of the international networks 
of transnationals and are concentrated 
geographically in the part of the country 
where the most FDI has occurred. They 
consist mainly of firms with foreign par-
ticipation, most of them established 
through greenfield investment. 
Table 2 
Shares of local suppliers in privatized companies 
 
Company Sector Hungarian suppliers’ share by local value added, % 
ABB Ltd  Energetics, machinery 45 
Adtranz Ltd  Diesel trains, freight trains 55 
BPW-Rába  Truck chassis 35 
Electrolux Lehel Ltd  White goods 40 
GE Lighting Tungsram  Light sources 50 
Knorr-Bremse Ltd  Brake structures 30 
SVT-Wamsler  Consumer electronics goods 55 
ZF Hungária Ltd Gear boxes 35 
Source: Ipargazdasági Kft. 2002A. 
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3.2. The share of foreign            
ownership 
Companies with foreign participation op-
erating in developing countries show a 
significant difference in their reliance on 
local suppliers between wholly foreign-
owned companies and joint ventures. The 
latter have a higher level of local supplies 
to total input due to stronger local 
knowledge and links, and the enhanced 
local participation helps the local diffu-
sion of knowledge, technology, etc. (Blom-
ström and Sjöholm 1999). But an empiri-
cal survey in Romania (Javorcik, 
Smarzynska and Sparateanu 2003) shows 
significant positive local spillovers only 
wholly foreign-owned companies and not 
in joint ventures. Yet no such difference 
was detected in Lithuania (Smarzynska 
2007). This has less relevance in Hun-
gary, where the latest available data 
(20032) shows 100 per cent foreign own-
                                                   
2 Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office. 
ership for two-thirds of companies with 
foreign participation were in 100% for-
eign ownership and the proportion has 
risen persistently in recent years. 
3.3. Sectoral differences 
The sectoral structure of FDI also has an 
impact on the degree of use of local 
suppliers (Tavares and Young 2006). Sec-
tors with a lower propensity to involve 
local suppliers (UNCTAD 2001) include 
some machinery sub-sectors, especially 
automotive and electronics. Among other 
things, the subtle production networks set 
up in these sectors create an entry bar-
rier for new suppliers explainable by the 
specificity of the product or technology 
and the high quality requirements of ex-
port-oriented investors. At the other ex-
treme, foreign affiliates in the food in-
dustry or production of building materi-
als, with relatively closed, small markets 
and high transport costs rely on local 
supplies to a great extent. It is important 
Table 3
The share of local supplies to greenfield investments in Hungary 
 
Company Production Local Hungarian share of value added, % 
Denso Ltd Diesel feeder pumps 0 
IBM Storage Ltd*  Hard disc drive <5 
LEAR Ltd. Inner structures of vehicles 10 
Opel Hungary Ltd Engines, cylinder heads and gearboxes <5 
Philips group Electronics goods 10 
Phycomp Ltd Assembly of condensers 0 
Sony Hungária Ltd  Electronics goods <5 
Thyssen Production System Ltd. Automotive goods 0 
Tower Automotive Ltd Assembly of parts of bodywork 0 
Zeuna Starker Ltd Exhaust-pipe structures 15 
Zollner Elektronik Ltd Electronics parts production 6 
* Production relocated to China in 2002. 
Source: Ipargazdasági Kft. (2002A) 
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to assess the “supply capacity” of sectors 
as well: rubber, plastic and metal pro-
ducing, for instance, can provide spare 
parts or components to a number of ma-
chinery sub-sectors (electronics, automo-
tive, general machinery production). This 
is also the case in Hungary, where these 
sectors account for the overwhelming ma-
jority of manufacturing suppliers.  
The structure of supplier “pyramids” 
differs in the various sectors using local 
supplies (Ipargazdasági Kft. 2002A). In 
Hungary, there are transnationals in the 
machinery, automotive and electronics 
sectors carrying out end-assembly or 
producing complete main components and 
positioned at the top of the pyramid (e.g. 
Audi, Suzuki, Philips, Nokia and Erics-
son), together with first-supplier transna-
tionals (e.g. LuK, VAW, Visteon, Leoni, 
Flextronics, Temic and Elcoteq). Numerous 
second and third suppliers have also in-
vested in Hungary. But the intensity of 
the links among these suppliers varies 
according to the level inside the pyramid. 
Hungarian suppliers usually join the sec-
ond, third or further levels, which gives 
them little direct contact with the top 
company or first supplier. (See, for in-
stance, Gelei and Nagy 2006 for Hun-
gary’s car, or Ipargazdasági Kft. 2002A.)  
The questionnaire survey supported the 
hypothesis of a sector effect on the inten-
sity of local-supplier use. The food sector 
had the highest “local-supplier intensity” 
of 71–80 per cent of total inputs, fol-
lowed by the pharmaceutical industry 
with 51–60. Significantly lower were the 
21–30 per cent shares found in the elec-
tronics and automotive industries. (These 
data refer to the share of local supplies 
for all companies, whether foreign or 
domestically owned. For the foreign-
owned, average shares were lower at 61–
70 per cent for food, but with similar 
shares in the pharmaceutical, electronics 
and car sectors. 
The character of the activity carried 
out at the transnational’s local affiliate is 
also sector-related, according to the tech-
nological characteristics of the branch. 
Large assembly plants may base their ac-
tivity solely on imported sub-assemblies, in 
which case the output share of local value 
added will usually be very low and im-
port ratio extremely high. Assembly lines 
of this kind are located mainly in elec-
tronics and some other branches of engi-
neering. The local contribution is mainly 
produced by unskilled labour employed at 
the assembly plant. Chances of supplies by 
other local companies are meagre, since 
the aim of the operation is to tap cheap 
unskilled labour. Local deliveries do not 
go beyond the bounds of facility manage-
ment, catering, cleaning and guarding (all 
service activities), which are not, of 
course, essential to the main product and 
do not provide the desired positive exter-
nal effects of improving local companies’ 
technological, managerial or marketing 
capabilities, or productivity or efficiency. 
There are some cases in Hungary of 
companies of this type, but the number is 
decreasing as labour costs rise. 
3.4. Export-oriented versus    
domestic market-oriented investors 
The main motive of investments also mat-
ters from the point of view of the extent 
to which domestic suppliers can be “in-
volved” in the production of foreign-
owned companies. This factor is related 
to other factors, e.g. the sector of in-
vestment and the mode of FDI entry. Big, 
export-oriented greenfield projects are 
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usually less integrated into the local 
economy than their domestically oriented 
counterparts. So firms selling to the do-
mestic market buy more local inputs (Al-
tenburg 2000, Smarzynska 2002). Taking 
another approach, vertically integrated 
companies buy less local than their hori-
zontally integrated counterparts (Caves 
2007). It has been shown (Reuber et al. 
1973) for developing countries that do-
mestically oriented deploy more local 
suppliers than export-oriented affiliates. 
The group of large, export-oriented pro-
jects in Hungary is easily distinguished 
from other companies (Antalóczy and 
Sass 2003), because the production share 
of exports is usually close to 100 per 
cent and they are among the top Hun-
garian exporters (Table 4). The group 
includes Audi, Flextronics, Philips, IBM, 
Suzuki and Samsung, to name only the 
biggest. These large, greenfield, export-
oriented projects had a maximum 10 per 
cent share of local supplies (including 
“purely” domestic and foreign-owned 
domestic). They represent almost one-fifth 
of Hungary’s total exports.3 In the ques-
tionnaire survey of Hungarian companies 
(Sass 2007), enterprises could also be 
categorized into domestically oriented and 
export oriented groups. For the latter, 
                                                   
3 Nokia, which does not publish data on activities 
in Hungary, has a similarly high export intensity 
and an estimated share in Hungarian exports of 
close to 10 per cent, so that together with the 
companies in the table, they represent close to 
half of all Hungary’s exports. 
the share of local supplies was 20–30 
per cent, increasing over time. For the 
former it was around 60–70 per cent. 
3.5. Performance differences be-
tween “domestic” and “foreign” 
sectors 
If the foreign sector differs largely from 
the domestic, this may affect negatively 
the formation of linkages between the 
two segments of the economy (Hunya 
2001). An environment where the two 
groups form such segments may hinder 
the evolution of forward and backward 
linkages. But the importance of the factor 
may decline as firms with foreign par-
ticipation become more established and 
familiar with the functioning of the econ-
omy, and the performance of domestic 
companies improves.  
In Hungary, the two segments differ 
considerably. Many studies have found 
that the main differentiating factor 
among groups of Hungarian companies is 
ownership (and not unrelated to that, 
size). Companies with foreign participation 
do better by all measures of company 
Table 4 
The top ten Hungarian exporters, 2005 
 
 Company Type of foreign share Sector 
Share of Hungary’s 
exports, % Export/sales, % 
1 MOL Shareholding Energy 9.6 47.9
2 Audi Greenfield Automotive 8.6 99.8
3 GE Hungary Privatized Electronics 4.4 98.0
4 Philips Greenfield Electronics 3.5 93.6
5 Flextronics Greenfield Electronics 2.9 97.3
6 IBM DSS Greenfield Electronics 1.8 99.9
7 Magyar Suzuki Greenfield Automotive 1.8 72.1
8 Alcoa–Köfém Privatized Metal working 1.5 94.1
9 Samsung Greenfield Electronics 1.3 77.6
10 Michelin Greenfi ld Autom. (tyres) 1.2 89.5
Source: Data published in the business weekly HVG. 
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performance, such as profitability, com-
petitiveness or exports, than their domes-
tic counterparts do. Labour productivity 
is significantly lower in the latter. The 
empirical evidence is still inconclusive on 
whether the difference between the per-
formances of the two groups of compa-
nies is narrowing, which would give an 
impetus to more linkages between them.  
3.6. The age of the investment 
Foreign-owned companies tend to increase 
the share of local inputs over time (Sa-
farian 1966, Blomström and Kokko 1997). 
Even with greenfield and export-oriented 
investments, a gradual build-up of local 
supplies can be observed, though the 
share of these remains relatively low. An-
ecdotal evidence on companies with for-
eign participation underlines the impor-
tance of this factor. For example, a link 
between the age of the local affiliate and 
the quantity of local supplies was shown 
in Ireland (Görg and Ruane 2000), al-
though no such link was found for 
European companies in another study 
(Tavares and Young 2006). Certain 
greenfield companies may have increased 
their local supplier base considerably 
since establishment. For example, the 
share of local supplies was below 1 per 
cent for the Hungarian Audi affiliate in 
1997, but has increased to 10 per cent. 
The questionnaire survey (Sass 2007) 
showed an increase between 1998 and 
2004 of a few percentage points in the 
average share of local supplies in Hun-
gary. 
  
3.7. Actual or potential local 
suppliers—the supply side 
Chances of establishing supplier linkages 
and the quality of these depend also on 
the size and quality of local businesses. 
(When comparing Northern Ireland and 
Ireland, this proved to be the most im-
portant factor explaining the different 
extent of the use of local supplies—
Hewitt-Dundas N. et al. 2002) For Hun-
gary, company cases were listed (Dőry 
1998) where finding local suppliers had 
been hindered by considerable quantity 
and quality problems. One major attrib-
ute of the Hungarian business world is a 
lack of medium-sized companies suited 
technically and financially to supplying 
large-scale batches with the desired tech-
nical accuracy, reliability and timing 
(Szanyi 2002b). Many of the better-
performing medium-sized companies be-
came foreign-owned during the privatiza-
tion process, as foreign investment was 
preferred. Most of the remaining firms 
were weak in many ways (products, 
markets, finances, management) and 
eventually failed. Unlike other transition 
economies, Hungary did not make serious 
efforts to bail such firms out. So only a 
few dozen medium-sized manufacturing 
companies remained to be acquired by 
Hungarian owners. These have the biggest 
chances of becoming suppliers, as they 
can keep up with the quantity and qual-
ity requirements of foreign-owned part-
ners. According to Ipargazdasági Kft. 
(2002B), only 7 per cent of Hungarian 
suppliers are medium-sized. 
This missing layer has also hindered 
the building up of Hungarian networks 
of suppliers in another respect. The num-
ber of the so-called medium and big 
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sized indigenous integrator companies is 
also relatively small, compared with other 
countries in the region (such as the 
Czech Republic), where other privatization 
techniques were employed. There are a 
few such companies surrounding Magyar 
Suzuki (e.g. Bakony Művek and Imag) or 
Videoton4 that act as contract manufac-
turers, but for other affiliates, the role of 
integrator companies is played by partly 
or wholly foreign-owned companies, 
which results in a smaller network of 
local suppliers and/or more limited spill-
overs. The many small ventures estab-
lished on the ruins of the insolvent large 
and medium-sized companies are still too 
weak and unprepared, technologically 
and financially, to become suppliers. So 
from the local firms’ side, it is the lack 
of good quality potential suppliers that 
hinders the development of local supplier 
linkages with transnationals. It is often 
medium-sized companies privatized 
through FDI, or traditional first-tier sup-
pliers of transnationals settled in Hungary 
that make up the locally acquired sup-
plies.5 The role of Hungarian companies 
is in many cases limited to assembly or 
to supplying first or second-tier suppliers 
of the affiliates with spare parts, and 
they are not able to develop their own 
products, for want of the financial and 
human resources.  
Ipargazdasági Kft. (2002A) reports 
that many Hungarian suppliers have sev-
eral customers, supplying electronics and 
automotive companies as well, using the 
                                                   
4 Videoton is a contract manufacturer for ABB, 
Philips, Sony, Matsushita/Panasonic, Kenwood, AFL 
and others. 
5 According to the business weekly HVG, ten of 
the biggest automotive suppliers had significant 
production capacities in Hungary in 2001. The 
presence and expanding production in Hungary 
of big carmakers (Audi, Suzuki, Opel/GM and 
Ford/Visteon) acted as a magnet for their tradi-
tional suppliers to follow them into the country. 
specificities of their plastic or metal 
products, which can be used for many 
different end-products. Hungarian suppli-
ers can be marked by smaller series (in 
some cases one-off products, specifically 
produced for the buyer), labour intensity 
and lower complexity, compared with 
affiliates of transnationals. It is not only 
the quality, but the quantity of local sup-
plies that potential domestic suppliers 
cannot offer. This also acts as a hurdle 
for Hungarian companies becoming sup-
pliers to transnational affiliates. 
There is a further requirement for 
suppliers: the stability dimension. That is 
why suppliers are required to supply 
more than one affiliate. For example, 
Audi and other automotive companies 
require that in total revenues of their 
suppliers, revenue from one company 
should not exceed 30 per cent. (Gelei 
and Nagy 2005, p. 16.) For many domes-
tic companies, this requirement cannot be 
fulfilled due to a shortage of labour, fi-
nancial means, skills, etc.  
3.8. The quantity of local sup-
plies—the demand side 
As a reflection of the previous factor, 
local companies are induced to make 
human and financial efforts to become 
suppliers, if the required quantity ensures 
profitable returns on the investment. In 
some cases, the quantity required by one 
buyer does not reach this threshold, and 
so the local company waits for other po-
tential buyers to appear in its geographi-
cal proximity (taking into account trans-
port costs), before taking steps to become 
a supplier. Supplying one company may 
be followed by becoming a supplier for 
20 
 
other companies in the network of the 
first company, or becoming suppliers for 
quite different companies. As a next 
stage, the successful supplier may follow 
its buyers to other regions inside or even 
outside the country. (A good example of 
this is Jászplasztik, which opened a new 
plant in Nyíregyháza after its main cus-
tomer, Electrolux, opened a plant there, 
along with another in Slovakia, just over 
the border, when a big buyer, Samsung, 
established an affiliate there—Bakács, 
Czakó and Sass 2005.) 
3.9. The size of the affiliate 
There may be another factor influencing 
the share of local supplies in total inputs 
of companies with foreign participation. It 
has been stated (Crone and Watts 2000) 
that there is a correlation between the 
sizes of the buyer (company with foreign 
participation) and of the supplier. Based 
on case studies from Yorkshire and 
Humberside, bigger affiliates seek bigger 
local suppliers, while smaller ones prefer 
smaller ones. (Similar results were ob-
tained by Barkley and McNamara 1994.) 
One explanation may be batch size, 
though it does not explain fully the link 
between the two variables. In Hungary, 
this can be one factor explaining the 
relatively small share of local supplies. 
Companies with foreign participation in 
manufacturing are usually larger sized, 
and so they may tend to seek larger 
sized suppliers. However, we could not 
find evidence for this. 
3.10. The impact of the national-
ity of the investor 
There are important differences in incli-
nation to use local inputs according to 
the nationality of the investor. This was 
shown (Dunning 1986) for Japanese for-
eign affiliates, and difference between EU-
owned transnationals have also been iden-
tified (Pearce and Papanastassiou 1997). 
However, differences also appeared when 
two British regions were analysed empiri-
cally (Crone 2002). In this respect, one 
can distinguish a “local supplier strategy” 
among extra-EU, export-oriented 
(greenfield) investors compared with other 
investors. These are mostly US, Japanese 
and South Korean companies established 
to supply EU markets from a relatively 
cheap location close geographically to the 
targeted market or itself part of it. These 
companies are “forced” to use local sup-
pliers to meet the local content require-
ments if they want to qualify for the 
preferential tariff treatment given to ex-
ports from Hungary to other EU markets. 
In many cases they are actively pursuing 
a strategy of enabling local companies to 
integrate themselves into the supplier 
network. Suzuki is a good example of a 
greenfield investment that basically does 
not fit into the Hungarian economic envi-
ronment and is export-oriented, but to 
qualify for preferential tariffs, it had to 
fulfil local content requirements defined 
in terms of value added inside the fac-
tory and local supplies.  
Not only Suzuki but the Japanese first-
tier automotive supplier Denso actively 
sought and found Hungarian suppliers 
along with some from other EU countries. 
Denso is rather cost sensitive and there-
fore continues to seek new, cheaper sup-
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pliers, which may mean opportunities for 
Hungarian SMEs. Denso has also devel-
oped a strict multi-level evaluation pro-
gramme. It starts recruitment with a 
meeting of some 100 firms in the imme-
diate region. The products are introduced 
and technical parameters set for the 
parts that can be purchased locally. Next, 
potential suppliers make offers that are 
evaluated. This is followed by company 
visits by Denso staff. If impressions are 
positive, sample production is ordered. 
With more sophisticated products, quality 
and durability are examined at the Japa-
nese headquarters. The procedure is time-
consuming. Once a go-ahead has been 
received from the lab, Denso visits the 
supplier again to check equipment, man-
agement and finance in the context of 
regular, reliable delivery at standard 
quality. Once these conditions are met, a 
contract can be made if the parties agree 
on sequencing, quantities, deadlines and 
price—not usually very high. In fact, low 
prices are offset by large-scale batches 
that can make production profitable. 
Only a few firms have qualified, but 
Denso believes that suppliers’ technology 
level can be upgraded to the required 
level through substantial investment in 
equipment, measuring devices and quality 
control systems, although no mention is 
made of active support for potential 
partners’ efforts. 
3.11. Global strategies of               
transnational companies 
The industries most important from the 
point of view of recruiting local suppliers 
and exercising substantial spillovers, the 
automotive and electronics industries, op-
erate increasingly within the production 
networks of international partners (Meyer 
1998). These international networks, 
which replace integrated transnationals, 
are usually dominated by one strong 
partner and feature longer-term supply 
contracts. These form barriers to entry 
into the production network for local 
firms. Big automotive producers do not 
outsource the production of parts and 
components that constitute the essence of 
their brand. In 2002, big automotive 
companies were producing about 50 per 
cent of the content of their cars them-
selves and outsourcing the rest (Gelei and 
Nagy 2005). So the key question in terms 
of the impact of FDI in a transition 
economy is whether or to what extent 
companies in the host country can be 
integrated into these production networks 
at all. In some cases, even with privat-
ized companies, domestic suppliers can be 
replaced by global suppliers to the parent 
company. In others, a domestic supplier 
that manages to meet the requirements of 
a local affiliate may become a supplier to 
other affiliates of the same transnational 
or to local affiliates of other transnation-
als. The method of supply organization 
means an increasing number of Hungar-
ian firms are not supplying the big 
automotive companies directly, but 
through their main foreign suppliers. For 
example, the SME Arge 2000 exports 
automotive spare parts to the foreign 
suppliers of car manufacturers of Por-
sche, Mercedes and Volvo. (Gelei 2006 
has more detail on Hungarian automotive 
suppliers.)  
It is important to note that second 
and first-tier suppliers of the big automo-
tive transnationals went through a merger 
and acquisition wave (due to the in-
creased and demanding outsourcing activ-
ity of carmakers). The global market of 
automotive suppliers is in the process of 
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concentration and the number of remain-
ing global players may be fewer than 30. 
This also has a limiting effect on the po-
tential involvement of Hungarian suppli-
ers. Similar tendencies may be present on 
the global market of suppliers to the 
electronics industry.  
3.12. The affiliates’ role in               
production networks 
The extent of local linkages also depends 
on the affiliate’s position in the transna-
tional’s network. Results for Hungary 
based on questionnaire interviews 
(Andersson and Forsgren1996; Vince 
2001) showed this with 49 engineering 
companies and similar results were ob-
tained in another study (Tavares and 
Young 2006 though their affiliate catego-
ries differed from those used in this pa-
per). 
Two groups of firms with foreign par-
ticipation can be distinguished according 
to their degree of reliance on local sup-
pliers. The first consists of majority for-
eign-owned companies with tight owner-
ship control, where the owner is a big 
transnational controlling every aspect of 
the affiliate. This covers many greenfield 
investments in Hungary. Inputs and out-
puts are traded inside the company; pro-
duction in the affiliate is centred on 
components and spare parts or on as-
sembling them in final products. From the 
viewpoint of industrial economics, this 
type of activity is rather similar to sub-
contracting. In both cases some handling 
and assembling of imported components 
is carried out and the total output is de-
livered back to the same foreign com-
pany. The share of local suppliers is low 
and they mainly provide services. One 
study (Majcen et al. 2003) proved that 
such assemblers have a very low level of 
independence in decision-making and 
simply carry out orders from headquar-
ters, so that they are effectively isolated 
from the local business community. 
In the second group (Vince 2001), the 
foreign owners of Hungarian affiliates 
are usually “smaller-sized” transnationals. 
There are some greenfield investments 
among them, but most are acquisitions 
(usually by privatization), where signifi-
cant changes have been made in the 
original production structure, technology, 
etc. The affiliates have their own prod-
ucts (brand names) and sell ready-made 
products, too. These affiliates usually rely 
more on domestic suppliers and have a 
greater say in their decisions affecting the 
share of local supplies. So they can be 
integrated more fully into the local econ-
omy and the spill-over effects from their 
cooperation with local suppliers may be 
greater. However, affiliates in one cate-
gory may change to the other, as ap-
pears in the case of Italian investments in 
East-Central and Eastern Europe, and 
there is a link between the main motive 
of investment (market-seeking or effi-
ciency-seeking) and the level of independ-
ence: usually efficiency-seeking, export-
oriented affiliates are less independent 
than their market-oriented counterparts 
(Onetti et al. 2007). 
For affiliates in Hungary, there are big 
differences in terms of their independence 
concerning local supplies and local sup-
pliers, and the above links can be traced 
here as well, to some extent. While lower 
local independence usually goes together 
with lower local supplies (e.g. in the case 
of Audi, Temic, Nokia), there are impor-
tant exceptions to that rule (e.g. Sanyo, 
ZF Hungária) where other factors may 
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influence the development of local sup-
plies more strongly (e.g. local content re-
quirements for Sanyo). Local supply deci-
sions may be taken first of all by affili-
ates that have a regional production task, 
make products exclusively produced in 
Hungary, or find local supplies more ad-
vantageous than imports (e.g. in view of 
specific transport costs). But on the basis 
of anecdotal evidence, there seem to be 
stages in the independence of affiliates. In 
the first stage, affiliates usually do not 
take local supply decisions, while in later 
stages, their local experiences with a few 
suppliers may lead more scope in choos-
ing others. 
3.13. What backward linkages 
mean to a local company 
Becoming a supplier to a transnational 
affiliate may mean more for a domestic 
company than the chance to sell products 
to another company, for there may be 
additional advantages. Local affiliates of 
transnationals may contribute to raising 
the productivity and efficiency of local 
companies in many ways (Lall 1980): 
helping prospective suppliers set up their 
production facilities, providing technical 
assistance and/or advice on raising the 
quality of products, organizing and man-
aging production etc., reducing the price 
or increasing the availability of raw ma-
terials and intermediary products for 
production by helping suppliers buy them 
(e.g. by organizing common purchase of 
inputs by a group of suppliers), and 
helping suppliers to find other customers. 
Let us look at the case of a Hungarian 
affiliate6 operating a large network of 
                                                   
6 Based on Bakács, Czakó and Sass 2006. 
domestic suppliers, and partly for that 
reason attaining an exceedingly high 
share of local value added, with certain 
products over 70 per cent of the total 
final-product value, and overall of 40–50 
per cent—among the highest in Hungary. 
The Lehel company, producing refrig-
erators in Jászberény, was privatized to 
Electrolux of Sweden in 1991. At the 
time, most parts and components were 
produced inside the company and there 
was a relatively limited network of sup-
pliers. Around 1996–7, production of 
certain parts and components, not be-
longing to core activities, started to be 
outsourced to local suppliers. The techni-
cal characteristics of the sector (high spe-
cific transport costs of most parts and 
components) meant that they looked for 
local suppliers.  
This outsourcing process provided the 
base for establishing a large local sup-
plier network. The process itself was 
timed relatively “luckily” for the latter: 
foreign suppliers did not make moves at 
that time to compete to carry out these 
activities. The process was helped by a 
strong local tradition in machinery, metal 
working and plastics, and related to this, 
the presence of strong local human and 
physical capacities. Because the affiliate 
was relatively independent in selecting its 
suppliers and because of sector specifici-
ties (high specific transport costs, season-
ality, need for quick reactions to changes 
in demand and tastes, and the need to 
reduce cost of warehousing), this resulted 
in a relatively large number of local 
suppliers.  
Electrolux Lehel’s active searching for 
local suppliers continues today. There are 
elements in the supplier policy of the af-
filiate that support local companies in 
becoming suppliers and members of a 
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network of suppliers, and even to form 
the basis of a cluster, and other elements 
that hinder this. For example, there is 
technical advice, common purchasing of 
inputs (so at lower prices), selling of ma-
chinery to suppliers during the outsourc-
ing process, and common development 
and adaptation activities. The last even 
elevates the relationship between Elec-
trolux Lehel and its suppliers to a higher 
level. It also helps from the point of view 
of networking and clustering that Elec-
trolux Lehel requires suppliers to rely on 
more than one source, namely the share 
of Electrolux Lehel in the total sales of a 
supplier cannot dominate. On the other 
hand, the supplier strategy of Electrolux 
Lehel demands that there be at least two 
suppliers of any component or part. The 
most important factor against networking 
and clustering is that for reasons of 
competitiveness, Electrolux Lehel concludes 
supplier contracts for relatively short pe-
riods. 
4) ARE SUPPLIER NETWORKS A 
GOOD BASIS FOR CLUSTER              
DEVELOPMENT? 
Transnational corporations are desired 
participants in clusters (Sölvell et al. 
2003), who may support their develop-
ment in several ways. They are in direct 
contact with world markets and can po-
tentially bring fresh news to the cluster 
at first hand. Their widespread interna-
tional linkages mean they can support the 
international activities of the cluster and 
of smaller cluster members. They may 
even lobby for their partners’ interests. 
Another potential support area is technol-
ogy. Transnationals usually have the latest 
technology and can offer technology and 
knowledge transfer to strategic partners. 
In fact such transfers and enabling poli-
cies are common in stable supplier con-
tacts. The intensity of such linkages de-
pend much on their level of inclination to 
develop a supplier network, which along 
with nationality and a global strategy, is 
perhaps the strongest determinant. An-
other technology-related area is R and D. 
One of the essential cluster functions, es-
pecially in dynamic clusters, is knowledge 
generation and distribution within the 
cluster. Should there be intensive R and 
D linkages among cluster members, in-
cluding research institutions and universi-
ties, it is likely that transnationals will 
also participate in the collaboration. Akin 
to knowledge generation is training and 
education. This is also based on coopera-
tion among heterogeneous partners, in-
cluding transnational companies.  
It has been seen that large interna-
tional firms can play important role in 
many important cluster functions. The 
large survey of international clusters 
made in 2003 survey (Sölvell et al. 2003) 
identified transnationals as important 
players. But developed market economies 
were heavily overrepresented in that sur-
vey. Patterns of cluster development have 
been found to be different in emerging 
market economies (Ketels et al. 2006). 
The first major difference is in percep-
tions of the role of clusters. In developed 
countries, they are treated as an impor-
tant tool to spur the innovation process, 
but economic policy in developing and 
transition economies regards clusters as 
tools for other policy purposes such as 
regional development, foreign investment 
attraction, or SME development. The 
other main difference was found in levels 
of social capital. While developed coun-
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tries’ clusters spend much energy on 
building up trust, this function is re-
garded as precondition for any coopera-
tion in clusters in the transition econo-
mies, where there is an acute, over-
whelming lack of trust and of entrepre-
neurial culture and experience in long-
term cooperation. Moreover, frequent 
changes in economic policy and institu-
tions result in low levels of trust in gov-
ernments, and in the dominance of short-
term business considerations over longer 
perspectives. These factors thwart cluster 
development and provide different em-
phasis for cluster activities. A low level of 
trust among cluster members (especially 
SMEs) does not support cooperation on 
strategic levels, as for example joint R 
and D projects. Much more emphasis is 
given to simpler functions such as joint 
marketing or procurement, lobbying or 
training. These specificities belong in dis-
cussion of the potential role of supplier 
networks in cluster development. 
Three questions need analysing in or-
der to see the potential role of transna-
tionals and their partners in cluster de-
velopment. The first issue is whether 
transnationals are even interested in de-
veloping the local business contacts dis-
cussed in the previous section. The next 
problem, dealt with in the main part of 
this section, is whether transnational-
integrated supplier networks are suitable 
for the development of clusters. The third 
question is whether transnationals are in-
terested in developing regional clusters 
for their own strategic interests. The ex-
amples of many clusters in developed 
economies, especially dynamic clusters, 
indicate that participating in local knowl-
edge-generating networks effectively at-
tracts all transnationals.  
We think that at least for the time be-
ing, emerging market economies do not 
offer strong conditions for knowledge-
based dynamic clusters or innovation sys-
tems that could provide strategic innova-
tion inputs for transnationals, although 
many possess strong innovation communi-
ties that could potentially serve as knowl-
edge-generating networks of international 
importance. So transnationals’ interest in 
developing deep cooperation networks, 
including participation in clusters, is 
weaker in emerging market economies 
than in developed countries. Yet as with 
conditions for developing supplier net-
works, cluster participation is plausible 
and desirable, albeit the likelihood and 
modes of participation may vary greatly. 
The next section compares from the 
transnationals’ point of view the condi-
tions for supplier network development 
with those for cluster establishment. This 
comparison highlights possible ways of 
organizing clusters based on existing 
supplier transnational networks. 
4.1. Ways to develop supplier 
networks and their           
cluster-forming potential 
In general, factors increasing the likeli-
hood of supplier network development 
are likely also to increase propensity to 
cluster involvement. But the two are not 
identical, and in some cases interests may 
substantially differ. So it is necessary to 
consider these determinants also from the 
cluster viewpoint. They are as follows: 
spatial concentration, specialization, het-
erogeneity of actors, simultaneous compe-
tition and cooperation, critical mass, and 
typical cluster activities. 
As far as geographical concentration is 
concerned, it can be seen immediately 
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that the main areas for FDI in Hungary 
are identical to those of intensive cluster 
development: the capital city, and the 
Northern and Western Transdanubia re-
gions. In fact investments started to form 
pronounced agglomerations in the 1990s, 
while cluster development (formal cluster 
initiatives) started only after 2000. The 
causal relations are rather unclear, as 
these regions used to be fairly developed 
industrial centres before the transition 
period, and their production potentials 
contributed greatly to their ability to at-
tract FDI. Later this potential was further 
strengthened by the transnationals them-
selves. Leading OEMs attracted their tra-
ditional suppliers to invest in the same 
region to ensure easy and smooth coop-
eration. This FDI pattern itself contributed 
to a large extent to the creation of suffi-
cient pools of specialized firms within a 
vicinity. OEMs also exercised strong pull-
ing effect on local suppliers. While many 
had their premises in historic industrial 
districts, new firms also settled into them. 
This process was reinforced by some pol-
icy measures. For over a decade, special 
industrial zones enjoyed privileges in the 
form of tax and customs relief, provided 
they exported their whole output. Tax-
free zones became hubs for greenfield 
investments that also incorporated many 
Hungarian suppliers (Antalóczy and Sass 
2001).  
Much of the export-oriented greenfield 
investment was carried out in the tax-
free zones, but it also has to be said 
that some 100 such zones were created, 
since regulations for establishing them 
were quite easy to meet. So the likely 
pattern of spatial concentration was one 
OEM and its traditional first-tier suppli-
ers, with local second and third-tier sup-
plier companies. Only on rare occasions 
did OEMs with similar final products set-
tle in the same hub. They tended to dis-
tance themselves from competitors and to 
prefer distance from their supplier net-
work as well (Szalavetz 2001).  
So significant concentrations of special-
ized firms were created in Hungary’s 
more developed areas. These consisted of 
technologically dependent suppliers of the 
value chain of single OEMs. The types of 
cooperation also helped the chain to 
function smoothly. Technology and knowl-
edge transfer was provided by the OEMs 
and other major firms to Hungarian 
smaller suppliers in the areas and to the 
extent it was necessary to improve their 
supply capabilities. The knowledge trans-
fer, but generally speaking, all coopera-
tion links were vertical: the OEM being 
in the centre, and other firms depending 
on them as satellites. Not only OEMs 
avoided contacting other OEMs of their 
branch, but horizontal linkages of suppli-
ers were also curtailed (at least not 
promoted). This means contacts to other 
transnationals, but also linkages among 
suppliers (for example in the case of 
Electrolux). There is some evidence that 
transnationals liked sporadic suppliers 
also because they could bargain lower 
prices when handling with separated, in-
dividual companies (Szanyi 2008). Sum-
ming up, FDI created hot pots for poten-
tial cluster development, but transnation-
als not really interested in creating coop-
eration and communication platforms 
among supplier firms, which would be 
an essential cluster function.  
We must emphasize the role of the 
tax free zones in spatial development of 
industrial districts in the first phase of 
the transition period. The advantageous 
regulation was however, lifted while join-
ing the European Union, since it was not 
regarded as compatible with competition 
rules. Also in this period there was an-
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other pattern of FDI in Hungary which 
was more connected with the privatiza-
tion process, and was regarded in the 
previous section as more likely leading to 
the development of supplier networks. 
From the point of view of the develop-
ment of horizontal linkages, or the possi-
bility of becoming suppliers of several 
firms, various OEMs, there is anecdotal 
evidence proving that the linkages were 
more frequent in these cases. However, 
transnationals in many of the privatiza-
tion cases were not interested in further 
development of suppliers’ horizontal link-
ages. Nevertheless, “inherited from the 
past” cooperation among some of the lo-
cal based suppliers might remain intact. 
Hence, propensity around these OEMs 
can be more likely than in the case of 
greenfield investments.  
Another aspect of cluster development 
is heterogeneity of members. It is clear 
that supplier networks around transna-
tionals serve mainly the business interests 
of the integrating company. Anything be-
yond that must be initiated by other par-
ties. Day-to-day interests of transnationals 
are simple: to run their production facili-
ties smoothly and efficiently (many of 
them are efficiency-seeking). They need 
reliable business partners in the value 
chain. But especially in the early years, 
they do not care much about the 
broader background. Many transnationals 
regard investment projects as one-off 
deals that last while favourable conditions 
prevail, but need not involve longer-term 
provision of such conditions. So institu-
tions in the broader production back-
ground (education, infrastructure devel-
opment, etc.) remain out of their line of 
vision. Early-phase local production net-
works usually lack the diversity that is 
an important feature of clusters.  
The situation changes with the age and 
development of investment projects. There 
is much empirical evidence to show how 
even greenfield investments changed their 
nature and behaviour (Szanyi 2003; 
Hunya 2001). For it is in their own effi-
ciency-seeking interest to tap cheap op-
portunities in almost the whole value 
chain. So they expand activity from final 
assembly of imported parts to increasing 
local component supply and participation 
in corporate functions (from accounting 
through logistics even to R and D). This 
expansion of affiliates’ activity in the 
global corporate networks is in line with 
the current wave of concentrating on 
core competences and outsourcing or 
“offshore-ing” much of the activity (Sass 
2008). The more activities carried out 
locally the likelier it becomes that busi-
ness and cooperation links will develop in 
various directions that go beyond mere 
technological cooperation among suppliers. 
Whenever there is more room for con-
tacts among heterogeneous market actors, 
potentials also increase for organizing 
these contacts and actors in formal ways. 
The clustering process may also begin 
from the bottom up.  
So-called integrator companies may 
play a big role in clustering. Gelei (2006) 
terms “network competence” the ability to 
manage a whole supplier network, so as 
to produce a complex supplied product. 
This type of company collects lower-level 
suppliers round itself, coordinates their 
activities, and cooperates with them in 
product development, according to buyer 
needs. The joint activities form a good 
basis for deepening cooperation, possibly 
into a cluster type. The foreign-owned 
affiliate acts as a catalyst—not an active 
participant in a cluster, but a generator 
of one. (Anecdotal evidence of this type 
28 
 
of cluster in Mexico appears in Arroyo-
Lopez and Bitran 2007.) 
Recent experience with labour shortage 
in some industrial bases in Hungary 
opened up new frontiers of cooperation 
with transnationals. National Instruments 
in Debrecen, Siemens in Budapest, Nokia 
in Szeged and Audi in Győr are just four 
examples of transnationals participating in 
the shaping and financing of university 
education programmes. Of course they 
do this because they need more high-
quality labour. Another welcome devel-
opment pattern is increasing transnational 
participation in financing and in part 
carrying out R and D projects in Hun-
gary. Some leading investors have estab-
lished R and D laboratories in the coun-
try. This also increases substantially the 
clustering potentials of some cities, where 
sufficient educational and innovation 
background is present. But it is not 
thought that dynamic clusters will soon 
play any major role in Hungary’s eco-
nomic development. It is good if transna-
tionals at least realize they may also 
benefit from cluster cooperation here, 
and become active members of clusters. 
Yet the fact that universities, R and D 
facilities, and maybe other actors have 
aroused their interest also supports the 
cluster idea and increases the chances for 
proper cluster actions.  
With the coexistence of cooperation 
and competition, Hungarian clusters may 
play positive role. Transnational supplier 
networks have always supported intensive 
competition among local firms. Coopera-
tion has been rather lacking, although it 
is very much in the interest of local 
firms to improve their ability to act 
jointly instead of singly. Clusters may 
play important role in organizing various 
programmes for development of partici-
pating SMEs. This is also in the interest 
of the transnationals heading the value 
chain. Other forms of cooperation, above 
all in technology and knowledge transfer 
or even generation, is also plausible in 
supplier-based clusters, especially if mem-
bers can change their way of thinking 
about vertical flows, but recognize there 
is also room for joint horizontal action. 
Empirical evidence indicates that this is 
the most difficult task of cluster manag-
ers, as many potential members are 
competitors for contracts of the top 
OEMs or first-tier foreign suppliers. Find-
ing ways of interesting transnationals in 
cluster cooperation is sometimes no more 
difficult than trust building among com-
peting local suppliers.  
As for the critical mass of clusters, 
there is very little information on this in 
Hungary. Empirical surveys show that 
formal cluster organizations do not set 
such targets. Many are in an early stage 
of development, so that the question is 
not yet relevant to them. Yet some gen-
eral conclusions can be drawn, using 
published guidelines (Sölvell 2003; CLOE 
2005). Achieving a critical mass is impor-
tant for three reasons: stability (against 
potential dropouts of large, dominating 
firms), self-sustaining (financially and in 
new entry attraction), and information 
flow and activity (a kind of density of 
cluster actions that provides the desired 
synergies). Transnational supplier net-
works alone have little chance of attain-
ing these goals. Membership of competing 
OEMs is unlikely. Still, there may be 
clusters that are not initiated or domi-
nated by OEMs, but established by other 
parties, building on suppliers to transna-
tionals. In this case, the attribute of use 
is the initially favourable condition of the 
supplier network—that there is a pool of 
potential cluster members. Using this 
pool, a cluster can be organized with or 
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without participation by the transnational 
itself. A good example of this is the Pan-
non Automotive Cluster (PANAC), Hun-
gary’s oldest and largest. But even this 
cluster was unable for many years to 
differentiate activities away from simple 
supplier-network development. It took 
time and some setbacks before the cluster 
management realized that proper func-
tioning could not be based solely on sup-
plier network development programmes 
(Grosz 2006). Representing the cluster’s 
own interests as a separate organization 
is crucial, and cannot be subordinated to 
one firm’s business interests. Furthermore, 
professional cluster management must be 
used, so that regular cluster functions 
are developed.  
4.2. Policy relevance                
and empirical evidence 
Clusters and cluster policies started to 
evolve only eight years ago, yet there are 
already some empirical surveys of cluster 
development in Hungary. Gecse (2004) 
provided a list of 22 clusters for the 
year 2003. At least half of these had 
some strong transnational participation, 
mainly in the field of the automotive and 
electronics industries (branches targeted 
by FDI attraction policy). When compar-
ing this list with the most recent one by 
Szanyi (2008), it can be that only 10 of 
the 22 mentioned still operated in 2007. 
All the others had disappeared. Of the 
survivors there were some transnational-
oriented clusters like PANAC, the show-
case automotive cluster. Others under-
went major changes. PANEL in electronics, 
for example, had to change name and 
core activity after the break with its for-
mer member IBM Storage Products PLC. 
Obviously this cluster had not attained 
the stability to provide critical mass. Fur-
thermore, PANAC had to change philoso-
phy and some activities after a major 
crisis in 2004–5 that led to a drop in 
membership. The new action plan concen-
trates on “new” areas of cluster devel-
opment like adjusted procurement policy 
and joint marketing actions, or organiza-
tion of a general assembly of members. 
Management realized there were general 
features and functions of cluster organi-
zation that were vital especially for SMEs, 
but neglected by the previous manage-
ment. More balanced cluster management 
activity soon turned the tide and PANAC 
regained momentum. 
To replace the failed organizations, 
much new activity started especially in 
2005–6 with the introduction of new 
cluster promotion schemes by economic 
policy-makers. But again, many of the 
grant-winning clusters showed no signs of 
still being proper clusters a year or two 
later (Szanyi 2008). Failed clusters were 
not usually bound to major transnation-
als. So it can be concluded that cluster 
organization has a rationale where there 
is transnational involvement, whereas 
many cluster organizations of local SMEs 
are only virtual clusters looking for sub-
sidies. Nevertheless, clusters with transna-
tional participation may also be fragile. 
This is the case where general cluster 
functions are underdeveloped, especially if 
activities are in a horizontal direction and 
no collaboration is developed among 
SMEs and other cluster members (univer-
sities, research laboratories). Unfortu-
nately, transnationals are in some cases 
not interested in the development of hori-
zontal cooperation links. They would 
rather see their suppliers isolated, not 
setting up a joint interest platform that 
may also increase SME bargaining power.  
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The two questionnaire-based surveys of 
Hungarian clusters (SEED 2003; Netwin 
2007) again proved that Hungarian clus-
ters showed rather weak internal coop-
eration focused mainly on establishing the 
cluster organization, less on activities es-
sential to cluster members. Both papers 
raised concerns about the efficiency of 
cluster-development policies and called for 
action. The grants for cluster support 
should be awarded competitively rather 
than on a normative basis, and the use 
of the grants should be controlled over 
the project life span. Another proposal 
was for the establishment of a cluster 
accreditation system to provide transpar-
ent and relevant qualification require-
ments. Such an accreditation scheme was 
introduced in 2008, with strong emphasis 
on innovative measures. This means the 
Hungarian government has followed EC 
guidelines and made cluster policies a 
tool of innovation policy. There is a dan-
ger that this new emphasis will shift at-
tention from general cluster attributes 
again: the cluster is not supported for its 
own sake, but to promote other, superior 
policy targets.  
 
* * * * * 
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